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Casenotes
CORINTHIANS SOCCER LOSES BY DECISION IN
SECOND ROUND PLAY-OFF OVER CORINTHIANS.COM IN
SALLEN V CORINTHIANS LICENCIAMENTOS LTDA
I. THE LINEUP (INTRODUCTION)
What could Michael Crichton, author of Jurassic Park and pro-
ducer of ER, possibly have in common with a Brazilian soccer club?1
Crichton used the World Intellectual Property Organization's
(WIPO) Uniform Dispute Resolution Proceeding (UDRP) to pro-
tect his domain name rights to michaelcrichton.com from a cyber-
squatter.2 WIPO awarded Crichton the rights to michaelcrichton.
com. 3 He joins actor Kevin Spacey and authorsJeanette Winterson,
Anthony Beever, and Helen Fielding in using WIPO's UDRP to
defend against cybersquatting. 4 Additionally, the Brazilian soccer
team, Corinthians, won rights to its domain name from WIPO as
well. 5
Corinthians used WIPO's UDRP to claim and win rights to the
domain name, corinthians.com, which was held by a man offering it
for sale.6 Yet, Corinthians faced a rematch in federal court when
the cybersquatter sued for return of the domain name under the
1. See 'Jurassic Park' Author Wins Domain, at http://www.cnn.com/2002/
TECH/intemet/12/03/cyber.squatting.reut/index.html (Dec. 3, 2002) (report-
ing Michael Crichton's recent Internet domain name dispute) (copy on file with
author).
2. See id. (noting Crichton's use of WIPO proceeding to claim michael-
crichton.com). For a discussion of the UDRP, see infra notes 57-63 and accompa-
nying text.
3. See id. (noting Crichton's recent WIPO victory for domain name
michaelcrichton.com).
4. See id. (listing celebrities and authors who have also used WIPO for
Internet disputes).
5. See Corinthians Licenciamentos LTDA v. Sallen, Case No. D2000-0461
(WIPO July 17, 2000) (Bianchi, Panelist) [hereinafter Corinthians Licenciamentos
LTDA] at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0461.
html (citing WIPO decision for Corinthians).
6. See id. (describing WIPO action and decision for Corinthians). For a
discussion of Sallen's use of corinthians.com, see infra notes 27-30 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of the UDRP action by Corinthians, see infra
notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
(49)
1
Robertson: Corinthians Soccer Loses by Decision in Second Round Play-Off ove
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2004
50 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOURNAL
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA). 7 The
cybersquatter was successful because the First Circuit found the
ACPA trumped the UDRP.8
What is cybersquatting at its most basic level? Suppose a James
Bond fan decides to look up the automobile manufacturer, Aston
Martin, on the Internet after reading about the Aston Martin D.B.
III driven by Bond in the book, Goldfinger.9 After searching for
Aston Martin, the fan is directed to www.astonmartin.co.uk.10 As of
January 2003, the Web site offered the opportunity to buy or rent
astonmartin.co.uk.1i Someone had registered the Web site, and
was offering it for sale even though Aston Martin is a registered
trademark of Ford Motor Company. 12 The site was operated by
www.domain-design.co.uk and was unaffiliated with Ford. 13 This
was cybersquatting at its most basic level. 14
Importantly, Congress enacted the ACPA in the late 1990s
amid rising concern over cybersquatting and the apparent difficulty
in prosecuting cybersquatters under existing trademark law.' 5
Concurrently, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
Numbers (ICANN), although limited in its power to respond to
cybersquatting, adopted WIPO's UDRP to handle domain name
7. See Sallen v. Corinthians, 273 F.3d 14, 16 (1st Cir. 2001) (indicating
Corinthians sued under ACPA). For a discussion of Sallen's suit, see infra notes 36-
41 and accompanying text.
8. See id. at 30 (noting decision against Corinthians). The court reversed the
dismissal for lack ofjurisdiction and sent the case back to the district court. See id.
For a discussion of the First Circuit's decision, see infra notes 117-69 and
accompanying text.
9. IAN FLEMING, GOLDFINGER 69 (Berkley Publ'g Corp. 1983) (1959)
(describing Bond's choice of "the Aston Martin or a Jaguar 3.4").
10. See Domain Design Limited, This Web Name Is for Sale or for Rent, at http://
www.my-web-site.net/aston2/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2003) (listing Aston Martin Web
address in United Kingdom for sale) (on file with author). But see Aston Martin
Web site, at http://www.astonmartin.com/start.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2003)
(showing Aston Martin now owns Web site).
11. See This Web Name Is for Sale or for Rent, supra note 10 (offering Web address
for sale or rent).
12. See id. (noting Ford Motor Company holds trademark on Aston Martin).
13. See id. (mentioning current Web site owner).
14. For a discussion of cybersquatting, see infra notes 48-53 and
accompanying text.
15. See H.R. REP. No. 106-412, at 5 (1999) (explaining reason and purpose of
ACPA); S. REp. No. 106-140, pt. 2, at 4 (1999) (disclosing date bill passed). For a
discussion of reasons for passage of the ACPA, see infra notes 66-79 and
accompanying text.
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disputes. 16 The idea was to provide an efficient and inexpensive
process for resolving such disputes without involving the courts.1
7
Which ultimately controls, the UDRP or the ACPA? This is
precisely the issue presented in SalLen v. Corinthians.'8 In particular,
the First Circuit faced two issues: (1) whether the ACPA provided a
cause of action sufficient to meet Article III's case or controversy
requirement; and (2) whether the ACPA could provide relief in
light of the UDRP proceeding. 19
This Note begins with a review of the underlying facts in
Sallen.20  The background section first looks at the activities
encapsulated by the term "cybersquatting" and the unique
problems it has presented to trademark infringement suits. 21 Next,
the background section examines the brief history of the UDRP. 22
In closing, the background section discusses the history behind the
ACPA and how it sought to fix the unique problems presented by
cybersquatting. 23  Next, this Note analyzes the First Circuit's
reasoning and analysis in Sallen.24 Finally, this Note concludes with
16. See Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 31741
(June 10, 1998) [hereinafter White Paper]. The regulation notes, in particular,
that:
The U.S. Government will seek international support to call upon the
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) to initiate a balanced
and transparent process, which includes the participation of trademark
holders and members of the Internet community who are not trademark
holders, to (1) develop recommendations for a uniform approach to
resolving trademark/domain name disputes involving cyberpiracy (as
opposed to conflicts between trademark holders with legitimate
competing rights), (2) recommend a process for protecting famous
trademarks in the generic top level domains, and (3) evaluate the effects
Id. at 31747. For a discussion of the creation of the UDRP, see infra notes 59-63
and accompanying text.
17. See Final Report of the WIPO Internet Domain Name Process, The Management of
Internet Names and Addresses: Intellectual Property Issues 46 (Apr. 30, 1999)
[hereinafter WIPO Final Report] (noting procedures should be fast, efficient, and
administrative), available at http://wipo2.wipo.int/process1/report/finalreport.
html.
18. 273 F.3d 14, 18 (1st Cir. 2001) (detailing two main issues in case); see also
Seth Stern & Gary Young, Cybersquatting Appeal Allowed, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 24, 2001, at
A17 (maintaining Sallen first of thirty-nine cases addressing UDRP and ACPA to
reach circuit courts).
19. See Sallen, 273 F.3d at 25, 27 (discussing issues presented).
20. See id. at 20 (noting underlying facts of case).
21. See id. at 18-20 (reviewing history of cybersquatting on Internet).
22. See id. at 20-21 (conveying history of UDRP).
23. See S. REP. No. 106-140, pt. 3, at 7 (1999) (discussing ways cybersquatters
avoided liability under prior trademark law); H.R. REP. No. 106-412, at 5 (1999)
(noting goals of ACPA and ways Congress hoped to achieve goals).
24. See 273 F.3d at 26 (discussing other cases); see also Broadbridge Media,
L.L.C. v. HyperCD.com, 106 F. Supp. 2d 505, 508-09 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (analyzing
2004]
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a discussion of the potential impact of the First Circuit's decision in
Sallen.25
II. PRE-GAME (FACTS)
On Monday, September 4, 2000, Sports Club Corinthians Pau-
lista, a Brazilian soccer club known as Corinthians, was ranked
number one on CNN's World Soccer Top Ten following the inau-
gural Federation Internationale de Football Association Club World
Championship.26 On August 6, 1998, two years before the success
of the Corinthians on the international club soccer scene, Jay D.
Sallen registered the Internet domain name, corinthians.com, with
Network Solutions, Inc. (NSI). 2 7 The Web site corinthians.com re-
mained inactive until September 1, 1999, when Sallen sent an
e-mail to Corinthians suggesting the team purchase the Web site.28
Corinthians' lawyers responded with a cease and desist letter on No-
vember 16, 1999.29 Although there is uncertainty as to when Sallen
UDRP and federal jurisdiction issues); Weber-Stephen Prods. Co. v. Armitage
Hardware & Bldg. Supply, Inc., No. 00-C1738, 2000 WL 562470, at *1-2 (N.D. Ill.
May 3, 2000) (discussing effect of UDRP proceeding on federal courts).
25. SeeJohn E. Ottaviani, It's Not Over 'Til It's Over, INTELL. PROP. TODAY, Mar.
14, 2002, at 36 (discussing possible ramifications of First Circuit's decision); see also
Jurassic Park' Author Wins Domain, supra note 1, (explaining how use of binding
arbitration still occurring).
26. See Corinthians Takes No. 1 After Club World Championship, at http://sports
illustrated.cnn.com/soccer/world/topl 0/news/2000/01/1 7/worldsoccer.topten.
html (Sept. 4, 2000) (describing climb in standings from fifth to first); see also
Corinthians Licenciamentos LTDA, supra note 5 (discussing name of team and popu-
lar name for team). Corinthians soccer team held Brazilian trademark to Corin-
tiao, which is Portuguese for Corinthians. See id.
27. See Sallen, 273 F.3d at 16, 20 (noting full name of Sallen and his register-
ing domain name); see also Corinthians Licenciamentos LTDA, supra note 5 (listing
actual date Sallen registered domain name); Cruzeiro Licenciamentos LTDA v.
Sallen, Case No. D2000-0715 (WIPO Sept. 6, 2000) (Barker, Sorkin, Tamassia San-
tos, panelists), at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2OOO-
0715.html (noting Sallen also registered domain name 'cruzeiro.com', for Cru-
zeiro Esporte Club, also known as Cruzeiro, another well known Brazilian club
soccer team).
28. See Sallen, 273 F.3d 14, 21 (discussing e-mail sent by Sallen to soccer
team); Corinthians Licenciamentos LTDA, supra note 5. The full text of e-mail stated:
dear sirs, please excuse the fact that i do not speak portugese. As the
owner of the url 'corinhtians.com,' however, i want to inquire whom i
might contact, associated with the football club, regarding the sale of this
domain, there has been considerable interest and i have been contacted
recently, by several people in brazil, regarding this purchase of this prop-
erty. It occured... to me that it is in your interest to own it. please feel
free to contact me atjdsallen@ix.netcom.com.
Id. at 4.3 (punctuation and spelling errors in original).
29. See Sallen, 273 F.3d at 21 (noting letter sent ordering Sallen to cease and
desist operating corinthians.com); see also Corinthians Licenciamentos LTDA, supra
note 5 (listing date letter mailed to Sallen). This was not a cease-and-desist order,
[Vol. 11: p. 49
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actually began using corinthians.com, he did eventually post bibli-
cal material on the site.30
On May 18, 2000, Corinthians initiated a UDRP complaint with
WIPO.3 1 In light of its popularity, Corinthians held a trademark on
its name with the Brazilian Institute of Industrial Property and
sought to protect its rights in the mark against Sallen.3 2 Pursuant to
UDRP rules, Corinthians claimed, "1) Sallen's domain name was
confusingly similar to its trademark; 2) Sallen had no rights in the
domain name; and 3) Sallen had registered and used the name in
bad faith."133 On July 17, 2000, two months after Sallen responded
to the UDRP complaint of Corinthians, the WIPO panel found in
favor of Corinthians. 34 The WIPO panel ordered Sallen to transfer
corinthians.com to Corinthians. 35
which is obtained by appearing before a court and requesting the order to prevent
someone from pursuing a certain activity. See BLACK's LAW DICIioNARY 215 (7th
ed. 1999). Rather, this was a letter from legal counsel for Corinthians demanding
that Sallen stop his activities. See Sallen, 273 F.3d at 21.
30. See Sallen, 273 F.3d at 21 (indicating Sallen asserted material was posted
before dispute began); see also Corinthians Licenciamentos LTDA, supra note 5 (tell-
ing how Sallen posted letters to Christian Corinthians by Paul).
31. See Sallen, 273 F.3d at 21 (noting date Corinthians began action against
Sallen).
32. See id. (describing how Corinthians holds trademark in Brazil for
'Corinthians').
33. Id.; see also Philip G. Hampton, II, Legal Issues in Cyberspace, 713 PLI/PAT
629, 664 (2002) (positing three elements which must be proven under UDRP);
Holger P. Hestermeyer, The Invalidity of ICANN's UDRP under National Law, 3 MINN.
INTELL. PROP. REV. 1, 25 (2002) (emphasizing three elements complainant must
allege and prove to win under UDRP); Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute
Resolution (Aug. 26, 1999), at http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/uniform-rules.
htm [hereinafter UDRP Rules] (last modified Feb. 5, 2002). Paragraph 3(b) (ix)
states:
Describe, in accordance with the Policy, the grounds on which the com-
plaint is made including, in particular,
(1) the manner in which the domain name(s) is/are identical or confus-
ingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the Complainant
has rights; and
(2) why the Respondent (domain-name holder) should be considered as
having no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name(s)
that is/are the subject of the complaint; and
(3) why the domain name(s) should be considered as having been regis-
tered and being used in bad faith[.]
Id.
34. See Sallen, 273 F.3d at 21-22. The WIPO panel found that: 1) corinthi-
ans.com was 'phonetically nearly identical to the Complainant's [Corinthians]
trademark'; 2) there was no use of "the domain name 'in connection with a bona
fide offering of goods or services'"; and 3) that "he [Sallen] was not 'making a
legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the domain name, without intent for com-
mercial gain [or] to misleadingly divert consumers."' Id.
35. See Corinthians Licenciamentos LTDA, supra note 5. "Therefore, pursuant to
Paragraphs 4(i) of the Policy and 15 of the Rules, the Administrative Panel decides
2004]
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Rather than accept the WIPO ruling, Sallen mounted a defen-
sive action by filing a complaint in a Massachusetts district court on
August 2, 2000.36 Sallen's court action temporarily delayed the
transfer of the domain name to Corinthians under the WIPO or-
der.3 7 Sallen executed the federal action within the ten-day window
allowed under the UDRP for court action.38 As a result of Sallen's
lawsuit, no further action could be taken under the UDRP "until
the registrar receive[d] evidence that the dispute ha[d] been re-
solved or that the court ha[d] dismissed the lawsuit or ruled against
the respondent on the merits."3 9
Specifically, Sallen sued Corinthians under the ACPA.40 As re-
lief, Sallen sought a declaration that he registered corinthians.com
lawfully and an order from the court preventing the transfer of the
domain name to Corinthians.41 Corinthians defended by moving
for a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. 42 Corinthians asserted that
they had no plans to sue Sallen under the ACPA and, therefore, the
court lacked jurisdiction.43 District Judge William Young was per-
to require that the registration of the domain name 'corinthians.com' be trans-
ferred to the Complainant, Corinthians Licenciamentos LTDA." Id.
36. See Sallen, 273 F.3d at 22 (averring date Sallen filed complaint in federal
court).
37. See id. (filing complaint had effect of staying transfer).
38. See Seth Stern, Federal Courts Could Override UDRP Arbitration: 1st Circuit
Court to Address Domain-Name Issue, 1 BoSTON LAw TRIB., Dec. 17, 2001, at 1
(describing date of Sallen's action within deadline for appeal provided by UDRP);
see also Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (Aug. 26, 1999), at
http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/policy.htm (last modified May 17, 2002) [here-
inafter UDRP Policy]. Paragraph 4(k) states, in relevant part:
If an Administrative Panel decides that your domain name registration
should be canceled or transferred, we will wait ten (10) business days (as
observed in the location of our principal office) after we are informed by
the applicable Provider of the Administrative Panel's decision before im-
plementing that decision. We will then implement the decision unless we
have received from you during that ten (10) business day period official
documentation (such as a copy of a complaint, file-stamped by the clerk
of the court) that you have commenced a lawsuit against the complainant
Id.
39. Sallen, 273 F.3d at 22.
40. See id. (indicating Sallen brought suit under ACPA); see also Stern, supra
note 38, at 1 (mentioning venue and grounds for suit).
41. See Sallen, 273 F.3d at 22-23 (listing various forms of relief sought).
42. See id. (describing defense raised in district court against Sallen's suit).
43. See id. (explaining tactical reasoning presented to court for lack ofjuris-
diction over issue). Corinthians claimed there was no controversy because they
did not seek to sue Sallen in federal court. See id.
[Vol. 11 : p. 49
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suaded by Corinthians' argument and dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction. 44
After dismissal of Sallen's suit, corinthians.com was transferred
to Corinthians pursuant to the UDRP provisions governing appeals
to courts of law.45 Subsequently, Sallen appealed the district court's
dismissal based on lack of jurisdiction. 46
III. SPRING TRAINING AND SCOUTING THE FIELD (BACKGROUND)
A. The Birth of the UDRP
The UDRP and ACPA were developed in the middle of the
1990s to combat a phenomenon unique to the Internet - cyber-
squatting.47 Cybersquatting occurs when a person registers a do-
main name on the Internet that is a trademarked name of a
company or product.48 Once the squatter registers a name, they
seek to sell the name back to the trademark holder for a profit.49
44. See id. (detailing that "[a]bsent the threat of suit there is no controversy
and jurisdiction is lacking"); see also Even though Registrant of Corinthian.com Domain
Name Lost Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy Proceeding to Trademark Licensee of Brazilian
Soccer Team Corinthiao, Federal Court Has Jurisdiction to Hear Registrant's Lawsuit Seek-
ing Return of Domain Name, 24 ENT. L. REP., June 2002, at 1 (noting name of judge
who decided to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction).
45. See Sallen, 273 F.3d at 24-25 (noting transfer effective upon dismissal); see
also UDRP Policy, supra note 38. Paragraph 4(k) states:
If we receive such documentation [of a pending legal action] within the
ten (10) business day period, we will not implement the Administrative
Panel's decision, and we will take no further action, until we receive (i)
evidence satisfactory to us of a resolution between the parties; (ii) evi-
dence satisfactory to us that your lawsuit has been dismissed or with-
drawn; or (iii) a copy of an order from such court dismissing your lawsuit
or ordering that you do not have the right to continue to use your do-
main name.
Id.
46. See Sallen, 273 F.3d at 16 (depicting grounds for dismissal).
47. See id. at 20 (quoting Sporty's Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman's Mkt., Inc., 202
F.3d 489, 493 (2d Cir. 2000) ("[A]ttributing increasing cybersquatting to 'lack of
any regulatory control over domain name registration."')); see also A. Michael
Froomkin, ICANN's "Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy "-Causes and (Partial) Cures, 67
BROOK. L. REv. 605, 608 (2002) (articulating problem of cybersquatting); Hamp-
ton, supra note 33, at 644-49 (characterizing problems of cybersquatting); Hes-
termeyer, supra note 33, at 5-6 (describing cybersquatting).
48. See Sallen, 273 F.3d at 16-17 (recognizing cybersquatting term for
cyberpiracy and domain name hijacking); see also Hestermeyer, supra note 33, at 3-
5 (describing differences in types of domain names). The ".com" or ".edu" is a top
level domain name and forms part of the Internet address. See id. The domain
name in question when someone is cybersquatting is the second level domain
name. See id. The second level domain name is where the name of a product or
company appears, "e.g. 'berkley' in http://www.berkley.edu." Id.
49. See Hestermeyer, supra note 33, at 5-6 (reporting people even register mis-
spellings of company and product names in hopes of catching surfers); see also
2004]
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Registering a domain name is easy.50 The first person to regis-
ter a domain name becomes the owner.51 A person seeking to reg-
ister a domain name need only contact the registrar and identify
who they are, provide contact information, list two servers, and un-
tilJuly 1999, no payment was required until a bill arrived via regular
mail about a month later.52 Under this system, the cybersquatter
could register any number of domain names with no outlay of capi-
tal and sell them before the bill arrived. 53
When the Internet first began, Dr. John Postel was the only
registrar for domain names.54 By 1990, NSI took over the role of
registrar and maintained a monopoly.55 Due to the monopoly en-
joyed by NSI and the growing problem of cybersquatting, the De-
partment of Commerce issued a report that became known as the
White Paper.56 In the White Paper, the Department of Commerce
called for competition in providing domain name registration and
for WIPO to develop an administrative proceeding to handle do-
main name disputes. 57 The White Paper led to the creation of
ICANN, which is a non-profit corporation charged with accrediting
domain name registrars like NSI and adopting policies and proce-
dures for handling domain name disputes via administrative
processes. 58
Froomkin, supra note 47, at 620 (registering common words matching trademarks
typical behavior among cybersquatters).
50. See Froomkin, supra note 47, at 620 (discussing how people register do-
main names).
51. See id. at 622 (exploring "first-come, first-served basis").
52. See id. at 621 (noting ease of registering domain name). After July 1999,
payment was required at the time of registration. See id.
53. See id. (describing almost "costless way to profit"); see also Hampton, supra
note 33, at 643 (announcing current contract calls for six dollar charge for each
registration).
54. See Hestermeyer, supra note 33, at 4 (deeming Dr. Postel first registrar
until 1990); see also Froomkin, supra note 47, at 617 (naming original Internet
czar).
55. See Hestermeyer, supra note 33, at 4 (noting registrar duty switched over to
NSI in 1990).
56. See White Paper, 63 Fed. Reg. at 31741 (depicting lack of competition for
registering domain names with trademark issues as major problems requiring at-
tention); see also Froomkin, supra note 47, at 622-24 (portraying goal of White Paper
as "imposing some order on the increasing controversy over domain name pol-
icy"); Hestermeyer, supra note 33, at 9-10 (discussing generally White Paper's
recommendations).
57. See White Paper, 63 Fed. Reg. at 31747; see also Hestermeyer, supra note 33,
at 4-5 (describing Commerce Department's plan for changing system); Froomkin,
supra note 47, at 622-25 (quoting request of WIPO).
58. See Sallen v. Corinthians, 273 F.3d 14, 20 (1st Cir. 2001) (asserting ICANN
non-profit corporation); see also Froomkin, supra note 47, at 612 (stating UDRP has
force because ICANN controls Internet registrations); Andy Sullivan, Internet Society
[Vol. 11: p. 49
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On August 26, 1999, ICANN adopted the UDRP as the admin-
istrative process for handling domain name disputes.59 WIPO actu-
ally promulgated the UDRP as part of the White Paper.60 With
ICANN's adoption of the UDRP, the complainant was granted the
right to choose the dispute administrator from among those accred-
ited by ICANN. 61 When a party registers a domain name or renews
a previous registration, they must agree to the UDRP in the registra-
tion agreement, otherwise they cannot register the domain name. 62
As a result of the required submission to the UDRP, there had been
3,845 UDRP decisions as of November 6, 2001.63
B. Uncle Sam Acts
The UDRP is not the only means of protection for trademark
holders battling cybersquatters on the Internet. 64 On August 5,
1999, Congress passed the ACPA. 65 The ACPA was designed to
make it easier for businesses and consumers to pursue civil actions
against cybersquatting.66 Congress was aware of the UDRP when it
Wins Control of '.Org' Domain, YAHoo! NEWS, Oct. 14, 2002 (on file with author)
(discussing ICANN's ability to change Internet registrars).
59. See UDRP Rules, supra note 33 (listing adoption date as Aug. 26, 1999); see
also Froomkin, supra note 47, at 651 (observing adoption date when final docu-
ments prepared); Hampton, supra note 33, at 663 (noting UDRP was adopted at
ICANN board meeting in Santiago, Chile in August 1999); UDRP Policy, supra note
38 (listing adoption date of Aug. 26, 1999).
60. See Froomkin, supra note 47, at 624 (indicating WIPO, body of UN under
treaty). WIPO's final report stated:
[o]ne perhaps unintended - or perhaps intended - consequence of
WIPO's proposal, was that although it was formally non-binding, some
dispute resolution decisions might escape judicial review - especially
those where the registrant lost. The process was formally 'administrative'
rather than a true arbitration. As a result it was unlikely to be subject to
laws regarding the public duties of arbitrators, or to appeals under arbi-
tration statutes such as the U.K. Arbitration Act. Indeed, it was unclear
whether in the United States, and perhaps in most other legal systems, a
losing registrant would have a cause of action that a court could be per-
suaded to hear.
Id. at 637.
61. See id. at 653 (raising possibility of 'plaintiff friendly' dispute administra-
tor); see also Sallen, 273 F.3d at 21 (noting WIPO one of four providers).
62. See Sallen, 273 F.3d at 20 (describing how UDRP is incorporated in regis-
tration process).
63. See Hestermeyer, supra note 33, at 1 (mentioning number of UDRP pro-
ceedings through November 6, 2001). But see Stern & Young, supra note 18, at Al 7
(reporting Sallen first of thirty-nine challenges to reach circuit court).
64. See Sallen, 273 F.3d at 16-18 (recounting relationship between ACPA and
UDRP).
65. See S. REP. No. 106-140, at 1 (1999) (positing date of passage).
66. See id. at 4. The purpose of the bill was to:
protect consumers and American businesses, to promote the growth of
online commerce, and to provide clarity in the law for trademark owners
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passed the ACPA, but felt more protection was required than the
UDRP provided.67
The ACPA sought to remedy certain weaknesses in the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA) exploited by cybersquatters to dis-
guise the harm of their wrongdoing. 68 Under the FTDA, prior to
the ACPA, a plaintiff had to show: 1) a famous mark; 2) the defen-
dant was using the mark commercially; 3) the use began after the
mark was famous; and 4) the use diluted the mark.69 One of the
easiest things a cybersquatter could do to avoid suit under the
FTDA was to avoid using the mark commercially by not offering
"the domain name for sale in any manner that could implicate lia-
bility under existing trademark dilution case law."' 70 This was possi-
ble because under the FTDA, non-commercial use of a trademark
by prohibiting the bad-faith and abusive registration of distinctive marks
as Internet domain names with the intent to profit from the goodwill
associated with such marks - a practice commonly referred to as
'cybersquatting'.
Id.
67. See H.R. REP. No. 106-412, at 5 (1999). The House noted that:
[t]he legal recourse provided for in this legislation, combined with the
intellectual property alternative dispute resolution procedures being
adopted by the domain name registrars, will give trademark owners im-
portant tools to protect their intellectual property. This is a measured
and balanced response to a growing problem, and will clarify that trade-
mark property rights are respected as the Internet continues to grow.
Id.
68. See S. REP. No. 106-140, at 7 (describing care sophisticated cybersquatters
use to avoid being sued under existing law).
69. See Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1324 (9th Cir. 1998)
(stating "[i] n order to prove a violation of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, a
plaintiff must show" these factors). At the time of this case, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c),
commonly known as § 43(c) of the Lanham Act, was the only means provided for
defense against cybersquatting. See id. Specifically, § 1125(c) provides the follow-
ing remedies for dilution of famous marks:
(1) The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled, subject to the princi-
ples of equity and upon such terms as the court deems reasonable, to an
injunction against another person's commercial use in commerce of a
mark or trade name, if such use begins after the mark has become fa-
mous and causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark, and to
obtain such other relief as is provided in this subsection.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000). Moreover, § 1125(c)(4) states, in relevant part:
(4) The following shall not be actionable under this section:
(A) Fair use of a famous mark by another person in comparative com-
mercial advertising or promotion to identify the competing goods or
services of the owner of the famous mark.
(B) Noncommercial use of a mark.
(C) All forms of news reporting and news commentary.
§ 1125(c) (4).
70. S. REP. No. 106-140, at 7.
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was not a ground for sUit. 7 1 In Panavision International, L.P. v. Toep-
pen, the defendant did not attempt to sell the domain name directly
to Panavision. 72 As a result, the Ninth Circuit had to be creative
and find that because the defendant registered many other com-
pany names as domain names, he was engaged in a business "to
register trademarks as domain names and then sell them to the
rightful trademark owners. '73 The court stretched to find a com-
mercial use, looking at Toeppen's entire enterprise, rather than the
single Web site at issue.74
The ACPA replaced the heavier burden of proving commercial
use under the FTDA with an easier, three-part test, requiring no
proof of commercial use or intent.75 The Second Circuit was the
first court to apply the ACPA in' Sporty's Farm, L.L. C. v. Sportsman's
Market, Inc. 76 In Sporty's Farm, the Second Circuit used a three-part
test to determine whether the ACPA provided protection against a
cybersquatter's use of a domain name: 1) whether the mark was
distinctive and famous; 2) if it was "identical or confusingly similar
to the ... mark"; and 3) whether there was a "bad faith intent to
71. See Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1324-25 (discussing noncommercial use of
trademarks).
72. See id. at 1319 (articulating offer to sell made only after Panavision or-
dered Toeppen to cease and desist use). Toeppen sent a letter which provided, in
part:
If your attorney has advised you otherwise, he is trying to screw you. He
wants to blaze new trails in the legal frontier at your expense. Why do
you want to fund your attorney's purchase of a new boat (or whatever)
when you can facilitate the acquisition of 'PanaVision.com' cheaply and
simply instead?
Id. Toeppen offered the site in exchange for $13,000. See id.
73. See id. at 1325 (emphasizing many other companies registered as domain
names with similar offers to sell only after being contacted by companies). The
dispute with Panavision originated in December 1995, when Panavision tried to
register Panavision.com as a domain name. See id. at 1319. At the time, Toeppen
had already registered the site and posted photos of Pana, Illinois. See id. Ex-
pectedly, Panavision ordered Toeppen to cease and desist, and he countered with
his letter offering to sell. See id. Toeppen was already infamous for registering
many other company names for his personal use. See id. He squatted on them and
waited for someone to offer to buy them. See id.
74. See id. (illustrating Toeppen "has registered domain names for various
other companies including Delta Airlines, Neiman Marcus, Eddie Bauer, Luf-
thansa, and over 100 other marks"). The court found that "Toeppen's commercial
use was his attempt to sell the trademarks themselves." Id. at 1325.
75. See Sporty's Farm, L.L.C. v. Sportsman's Mkt., Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 497-98
(2d Cir. 2000) (announcing three factors which must be proven under ACPA for
injunctive relief).
76. See id. at 495-96 (remarking upon court's realization it would be first to
interpret ACPA at appellate level).
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profit. ' 77 This eliminated the commercial activity requirement, re-
placing it with bad faith and trafficking to find commercial activity,
without the need for judicial stretching, as exemplified in Panavi-
sion.78 To find bad faith under the ACPA, Congress provided a
non-exclusive list of nine factors for courts to utilize.
79
77. Id. at 497-98; see also Broadbridge Media, L.L.C. v. HyperCD.com, 106 F.
Supp. 2d 505, 510 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (promulgating three factors which must be
shown under ACPA). Furthermore, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (1) (A) reads, in relevant
part:
A person shall be liable in a civil action by the owner of a mark, including
a personal name which is protected as a mark under this section, if, with-
out regard to the goods or services of the parties, that person
(i)has a bad faith intent to profit from that mark, including a personal
name which is protected as a mark under this section; and
(ii)registers, traffics in or uses a domain name that-
(I)in the case of a mark that is distinctive at the time of registration of the
domain name, is identical or confusingly similar to that mark;
(II)in the case of a famous mark that is famous at the time of registration
of the domain name, is identical or confusingly similar to or dilutive of
that mark; or
(III)is a trademark, word, or name protected ....
15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A) (2000).
78. See H.R. REP. No. 106-412, at 11 (1999). As to bad faith and trafficking:
This factor is not intended to create a loophole that otherwise might swal-
low the bill, however, by allowing a domain name registrant to evade ap-
plication of the Act by merely putting up a noninfringing site under an
infringing domain name. For example, in the well know [sic] case of
Panavision Int'l v. Toeppen, a well known cyberpirate had registered a
host of domain names .... This act would not allow a person to evade
the holding of that case - which found that Mr. Toeppen had made a
commercial use of the Panavision marks and that such uses were, in fact,
diluting under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act - merely by posting
non-infringing uses of the trademark on a site accessible under the of-
fending domain name ....
Id.
79. See § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i). In particular, § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i) provides the
following:
In determining whether a person has a bad faith intent described under
subparagraph (a), a court may consider factors such as, but not limited
to-
(I) the trademark or other intellectual property rights of the person, if
any, in the domain name;
(II) the extent to which the domain name consists of the legal name of
the person or a name that is otherwise commonly used to identify that
person;
(III) the person's prior use, if any, of the domain name in connection
with the bona fide offering of any goods or services;
(IV) the person's bona fide noncommercial or fair use of the mark in a
site accessible under the domain name;
(V) the person's intent to divert consumers from the mark owner's on-
line location to a site accessible under the domain name that could harm
the goodwill represented by the mark, either for commercial gain or with
the intent to tarnish or disparage the mark, by creating a likelihood of
confusion as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of
the site;
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Congress sought to make it easier for trademark holders to de-
fend their rights on the Internet.80 Congress also sought to protect
those who used a trademark name fairly or found the name neces-
sary to use when exercising their free speech rights. 81 As part of the
effort to guard the rights of those innocently and properly using a
trademarked domain name, Congress created a section of the
ACPA to deal specifically with actions taken by domain name regis-
trars and registries in removing or transferring domain names.82
For the most part, section 1114(D) insulates registrars from
civil liability for any action they may have taken with regard to
cybersquatters. 83 Congress passed this measure with the knowledge
that some may try to challenge UDRP proceedings by taking the
registrars to court.8 4 Congress not only protected the registrars, but
(VI) the person's offer to transfer, sell, or otherwise assign the domain
name to the mark owner or any third party for financial gain without
having used, or having an intent to use, the domain name in the bona
fide offering of any goods or services, or the person's prior conduct indi-
cating a pattern of such conduct;
(VII) the person's provision of material and misleading false contact in-
formation when applying for the registration of the domain name, the
person's intentional failure to maintain accurate contact information, or
the person's prior conduct indicating a pattern of such conduct;
(VIII) the person's registration or acquisition of multiple domain names
which the person knows are identical or confusingly similar to marks of
others that are distinctive at the time of registration of such domain
names, or dilutive of famous marks of others that are famous at the time
of registration of such domain names, without regard to the goods or
services of the parties; and
(IX) the extent to which the mark incorporated in the person's domain
name registration is or is not distinctive and famous within the meaning
of subsection (c) (1) of this section.
Id.
80. See H.R. REP. No. 106-412, at 11 (suggesting adoption of trafficking and
bad faith factors should make proof easier).
81. See S. REP. No. 106-140, at 10-11 (1999) (recognizing protection ACPA
tries to afford free speech users).
82. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(D) (i) (I) (2000). Importantly, § 1114(D) (i) (I) states,
in part:
A domain name registrar, a domain name registry, or other domain
name registration authority that takes any action described under clause
(ii) affecting a domain name shall not be liable for monetary relief or,
except as provided in subclause (II), for injunctive relief, to any person
for such action, regardless of whether the domain name is finally deter-
mined to infringe or dilute the mark.
Id. In addition, § 1114(D) (ii) provides: "An action referred to under clause (i) (I)
is any action of refusing to register, removing from registration, transferring, tem-
porarily disabling, or permanently canceling a domain name." § 1114(D)(ii).
83. See § 1114(D) (ii) (v) (providing civil liability protection for registrars).
84. See H.R. REp. No. 106-412, at 5 (noting UDRP and need to combine action
in ACPA with UDRP).
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it also afforded some protection to innocent domain name users.8 5
This protection was achieved through the provision of injunctive
relief for those who felt their domain names had been wrongly
taken in an administrative proceeding.86 Notably, the injunctive re-
lief is only available against the mark holder, not the registrar or
registry, and only after notice is provided to the mark holder.
8 7
This clause comports closely with the UDRP's provisions for judicial
review.88 Thus, Congress created a complimentary relationship be-
tween the ACPA and UDRP.8 9
C. Officiating the UDRP and ACPA
The UDRP is a relatively new creation in the world of the In-
ternet.90 There have been few judicial interpretations of the UDRP
due to its short existence.9 1 In Weber-Stephen Products Co. v. Armitage
85. See § 1114(2)(D)(v). In pertinent part, § 1114(2)(D)(v) states:
A domain name registrant whose domain name has been suspended, dis-
abled, or transferred under a policy described under clause (ii) (II) may,
upon notice to the mark owner, file a civil action to establish that the
registration or use of the domain name by such registrant is not unlawful
under this chapter. The court may grant injunctive relief to the domain
name registrant, including the reactivation of the domain name or trans-
fer of the domain name to the domain name registrant.
Id. Moreover, § 1114(ii) (II) provides: "in the implementation of a reasonable pol-
icy by such registrar, registry, or authority prohibiting the registration of a domain
name that is identical to, confusingly similar to, or dilutive of another's mark."
§ 1114(ii)(II). See generally Broadbridge Media, L.L.C. v. HyperCD.com, 106 F.
Supp. 2d 505, 511 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (claiming "Congress clearly intended to use the
bad faith element of the statute as a way to narrow the breadth of the statute").
Specifically,
[T]he bill does not extend to innocent domain name registrations by
those who are unaware of another's use of the name, or even to someone
who is aware of the trademark status of the name but registers a domain
name containing the mark for any reason other than with bad faith intent
to profit from the goodwill associated with that mark.
H.R. REP. No. 106-412, at 10.
86. See § 1114(D) (i) (II) (providing for injunctive relief).
87. See id. (making injunctive relief available against mark holder only).
88. See UDRP Policy, supra note 38 (setting forth provisions of UDRP). For a
discussion of these provisions, see supra notes 38 and 45.
89. See Sallen v. Corinthians, 273 F.3d 14, 29 (1st Cir. 2001) (disclosing rela-
tionship between ACPA and UDRP); see also H.R. RE. No. 106-412, at 5 (revealing
desire of House that ACPA and UDRP combine to combat cybersquatting).
90. See Hampton, supra note 33, at 663 (showing date UDRP was adopted by
ICANN board). For a discussion on age of UDRP, see supra note 59 and accompa-
nying text.
91. See Sallen, 273 F.3d at 26 (maintaining few cases have interpreted UDRP);
see also Stem & Young, supra note 18, at A17 (observing Sallen first of thirty-nine
challengers to UDRP to reach circuit courts).
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Hardware & Building Supply, Inc.,9 2 a district court was the first to
interpret the legal effect of a WIPO proceeding and to determine
whether decisions by WIPO administrative panels were binding on
federal courts.9 3 The court looked at the UDRP policy and rules,
noting they "do contemplate the possibility of parallel proceedings
in federal court."94 Despite fears of the defendant, the court also
found that based on the language of the UDRP itself, the decisions
of any panel under the UDRP would not be binding on federal
courts. 95 In fact, WIPO even interpreted the language of the UDRP
as non-binding on federal courts. 96 Thus, Weber-Stephen, the first
92. No. 00-C1738, 2000 WL 562470, at *1-2 (N.D. Ill. May 3, 2000) (discussing
whether federal courts are bound by WIPO panel decisions).
93. See id. The plaintiff filed both a UDRP complaint and suit in federal court
alleging cyberpiracy. See id. The defendant was concerned "that if the panel's arbi-
tration decision is binding on this Court, Armitage will suffer irreparable harm
because our review of the panel's decision will necessarily be circumscribed pursu-
ant to the deference accorded arbitrators' decisions under the Federal Arbitration
Act." Id. at *1. Weber-Stephen was suing Armitage to obtain a domain name
owned by Armitage that Weber-Stephen claimed infringed its mark in bad faith.
See id. Weber-Stephen first filed a UDRP complaint and filed suit the next day. See
id. Armitage had moved "to declare the administrative proceeding non-binding
and to stay [the] case in favor of the administrative action, or alternatively -
should [the court] find the other proceeding to be binding - to stay it [to] con-
sider whether Armitage's participation in that proceeding can be compelled." Id.
The decision of the WIPO panel was due on May 5, 2000, and the court's decision
on the effect of such a decision came on May 3, 2000. See id.
94. See id. at *1-2 (indicating court's interpretation of UDRP rules and policy
found no barrier to simultaneous proceedings in UDRP and federal court); see also
UDRP Policy, supra note 38 (depicting UDRP's stance on and course of action when
litigation initiated during UDRP proceeding). The UDRP Policy holds "[t]he
mandatory administrative proceeding requirements set forth in paragraph 4 shall
not prevent either you or the complainant from submitting the dispute to a court
of competent jurisdiction for independent resolution before such mandatory ad-
ministrative proceeding is commenced or after such proceeding is concluded." Id.
Paragraph 18(a) of the UDRP Rules states:
In the event of any legal proceedings initiated prior to or during an ad-
ministrative proceeding in respect of a domain-name dispute that is the
subject of the complaint, the Panel shall have the discretion to decide
whether to suspend or terminate the administrative proceeding, or to
proceed to a decision.
See UDRP Rules, supra note 33. For a further discussion of paragraph 4(k) of the
UDRP policy, see supra notes 38 and 45. 1,
95. See Weber-Stephen, 2000 WL 562470, at *1-2 (quoting language of UDRP
paragraph 4(k)); see also UDRP Policy, supra note 38 (containing language of UDRP
paragraph 4(k)).
96. See Weber-Stephen, 2000 WL 562470, at *2. The WIPO sent an e-mail to
Armitage's counsel stating that "the administrative panel's determination would be
binding on the registrar of the domain name, but that '[t]his decision is not bind-
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case to look at the effects of WIPO decisions, found decisions under
the UDRP were non-binding on federal courts.97
There are few decisions that deal with the ACPA and the
UDRP together because of their relatively recent passage. 98 Until
Sallen, none of the thirty-nine cases involving the UDRP and ACPA
even reached the appellate level.99 Two district court opinions that
address the interplay between the ACPA and UDRP are Broadbridge
Media, L.L.C. v. HyperCD.com00 and Parisi v. Netleaming, Inc.10 1
Broadbridge involved a cybersquatter who demanded exorbitant
sums to release a domain name to its mark holder. 10 2 The plaintiff
filed a complaint against the cybersquatter under the UDRP and
also filed an in rem action against the cybersquatter under the
ACPA. 03 The defendants claimed the court lacked jurisdiction be-
cause the plaintiff was proceeding under the UDRP. 104 The court
found such an interpretation to be contrary to the language of the
UDRP. 105 As for the ACPA, the court found trademark rights had
been violated, but spent considerable time discussing the element
97. See id. "Neither the ICANN policy nor its governing rules dictate to courts
what weight should be given to a panel's decision." Id. The court also noted that
"[n]o federal court has yet considered the legal effect of a WIPO proceeding." Id.
at *1.
98. See Hampton, supra note 33, at 663 (stating date UDRP adopted); see also
S. REP. No. 106-140, at 4 (1999) (averring date UDRP passed); H.R. REP. No. 106-
412, at 5 (1999) (listing date ACPA passed). For a discussion of dates UDRP and
ACPA were adopted, see supra notes 59 and 65.
99. See Stern & Young, supra note 18, at A17 (characterizing Sallen as first of
thirty-nine cases addressing UDRP and ACPA to reach circuit courts).
100. 106 F. Supp. 2d 505, 510-12 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
101. 139 F. Supp. 2d 745, 749-53 (E.D. Va. 2001).
102. See Broadbridge, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 507-08. Broadbridge actually main-
tained HyperCD.com until March 1, 2000, when it failed to renew its registration.
See id. On March 22, 2000, Barry Henderson registered HyperCD.com for the
company he worked for because it was available due to Broadbridge's error. See id.
On March 23, 2000, Broadbridge contacted Henderson, explained their error in
not renewing registration of the domain name and offered to reimburse Hender-
son the seventy dollars it cost him to register. See id. at 508. Henderson rejected
the offer and was then offered $1,000. Id. Henderson stated, "I said that I would
be open to a financial compensation in return for transferring the hyper[CD].com
domain name ... I would only be open to this alternative if any compensation that
you offer is in keeping with I [sic] consider to be the significant intrinsic value of
the name." Id. at 508. Henderson later demanded a monthly fee of $4,250 or
$85,000 to transfer the name outright. See id. Broadbridge offered a maximum of
$5,000. See id.
103. See id. (designating in rem jurisdiction because Henderson was Cana-
dian).
104. See id. (arguing "when plaintiff filed its domain name dispute complaint,
it waived its right to also proceed in federal court").
105. See id. at 509 (explaining panel has "discretion to terminate, suspend, or
proceed with an administrative proceeding once court proceedings on the same
matter have begun"). The court also found "that experts in this field likewise in-
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of bad faith. 10 6 The court focused on bad faith because "Congress
clearly intended to use the bad faith element of the statute as a way
to narrow the breadth of the statute."'1 7 Congress narrowed the
statute to protect innocent users and to close in on cybersquat-
ters.108 The court looked beyond the nine factors of bad faith, also
considering the defendant's "[h]olding [of] the domain name hos-
tage" in establishing bad faith intent to profit.109
In Parisi, there was once again tension between the UDRP and
the ACPA. 110 The plaintiff brought an action for a declaration of
lawful use under the ACPA. 111 Netlearning, the winner of the
UDRP proceeding, sought to dismiss the court action, arguing it
was improper to vacate an arbitration award. 112 Parisi, who had lost
under the UDRP, was attempting to nullify that decision with a dec-
laration under the ACPA. 1 1 3 The court examined the UDRP to de-
cide whether the case should be dismissed as a binding arbitration
award." 4 The court presented four reasons why the UDRP deci-
sion was not a binding arbitration award: 1) the UDRP allows for
terpret paragraph 4(k) as not prohibiting a complainant from going to court." Id.
For a discussion of paragraph 4(k), see supra notes 38 and 45.
106. See id. at 511 (declaring bad faith is "a necessary element to plaintiffs
case").
107. Broadbridge, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 511; see also Sporty's Farm, L.L.C. v.
Sportsman's Mkt., Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 498 (2d Cir. 2000) (discussing nine factors in
ACPA for bad faith). For a further discussion of bad faith, see supra notes 78-79
and accompanying text.
108. See Broadbridge, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 511 (emphasizing Congress's desire to
protect innocent use); see also H.R. REP. No. 106-412, at 1 (1999) (mentioning
desire to protect innocent users). For a discussion of innocent users under the
ACPA, see supra notes 81-87 and accompanying text.
109. See Broadbridge, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 512 (noting other factors used by court
to find bad faith).
110. See Parisi v. Netlearning, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 745, 748 (E.D. Va. 2001)
(announcing claims made by both parties). Parisi registered the domain name
netlearning.com on April 5, 1996. See id. He then proceeded to use the domain
name to provide links to several universities. See id. On May 12, 1997, Netlearning
began to operate netlearning.com. See id. In early 2000, Netlearning offered to
purchase netlearning.com from Parisi for $22,500. See id. After Parisi refused,
Netlearning commenced a UDRP proceeding. See id. On October 16, 2000, the
UDRP found for Netlearning and Parisi filed for a declaratory judgment of lawful
use under the ACPA § 1114(2)(D). See id.
111. See id. at 748-49 (describing actions of parties).
112. See id. (detailing Netlearning's attempt to claim UDRP decision was
binding).
113. See id. at 748 (noting Oct. 16, 2000, decision for Netlearning, combined
with subsequent lawsuit by Parisi on Oct. 30, 2000). For a discussion of declaratory
relief under the ACPA, see supra note 85 and accompanying text.
114. See id. at 751 (finding UDRP "creates a contract-based scheme" for third
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simultaneous lawsuits; 2) the parties to the UDRP are not com-
pelled to sue under the UDRP process; 3) the UDRP decision can
be suspended by filing a lawsuit; and 4) the UDRP does not hold
out its proceedings as binding because of possible litigation. 115 The
court did not rule on Parisi's ACPA challenge; just the motion to
dismiss. 116
IV. PLAY-BY-PLAY (ANALYsIs)
A. The Game (Narrative Analysis)
In Sallen, the First Circuit addressed several issues raised by
Corinthians in hopes of sustaining the district court's dismissal. 117
This analysis focuses on the court's handling of two issues involving
the interpretation of the UDRP and the ACPA.118 Contrary to
Corinthians' claims, the First Circuit found a controversy existed
sufficient to satisfy Article III of the Constitution.1 9 The court also
held that a decision under the ACPA could provide Sallen with re-
lief for the loss of corinthians.com, despite the claim by Corinthians
that if any dispute existed, it existed under the UDRP and not the
ACPA.120
The First Circuit analyzed and rejected Corinthians' claim that
Sallen did not meet the Article III case or controversy requirement
115. See Parisi, 139 F. Supp. 2d at 751-52. The court cited to paragraph 4(k)
of UDRP to find "parallel litigation" countenanced by UDRP. See id. Paragraph
4(k) also convinced the court that no one is compelled to use the UDRP. See id.
In the court's opinion, complainants were "strangers to the registration agree-
ment" so it would be impossible to compel them to participate in the UDRP con-
tract, which is part of the registration agreement. See id. at 751. Because parties
under the UDRP may suspend a decision while litigating it, the court found chal-
lenges in court were actually mandated, unlike in conventional arbitration cases.
See id. at 751-52. Finally, because the UDRP calls for a de novo review in the courts,
it in no way contemplates binding the parties to its decisions. See id.
116. See id. at 753 (holding Federal Arbitration Act not applicable to UDRP
decisions reviewed in civil court).
117. See Sallen v. Corinthians, 273 F.3d 14, 25-27 (1st Cir. 2001) (characteriz-
ing major issues of case). The court also noted that:
This case raises an issue of first impression, requiring us to determine
whether a domain name registrant, who has lost in a WIPO-adjudicated
UDRP proceeding, may bring an action in federal court under
§ 1114(2) (D) (v) seeking to override the result of the earlier MIPO pro-
ceeding by having his status as a nonviolator of the ACPA declared and by
getting an injunction forcing a transfer of the disputed domain name
back to him.
Id. at 18.
118. See id. at 25-27 (noting issues in case).
119. See id. at 25-26 (finding first major issue in Article III case or controversy
requirement); see also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (requiring case or controversy).
120. See Sallen, 273 F.3d at 26 (noting dispute existed under UDRP, not
ACPA).
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when he filed for a declaratory judgment under the ACPA.121 Sal-
len had filed for a declaration that he did not violate the ACPA and
that he should not have to transfer corinthians.com to Corinthi-
ans.122 The court noted Corinthians' argument that Sallen must
fear being sued for declaratory relief to meet the requirements of
Article 111.123 As might be expected, Corinthians claimed to have
no plans to sue, thereby rendering Sallen incapable of having a rea-
sonable apprehension of Suit. 124 Yet, the court found that a reason-
able apprehension of suit was unnecessary in this case. 125 The
court was able to find other grounds to satisfy the case or contro-
versy requirement. 126 These other grounds rendered the "reasona-
ble apprehension question irrelevant."'127
The events the court cited as other grounds for satisfying the
case or controversy requirement had already occurred.1 28 Sallen
had already participated in a UDRP proceeding. 129 He had been
ordered to transfer the domain name, corinthians.com, to Corinthi-
ans.130 Sallen had also transferred the domain name after his initial
complaint was dismissed by the district court. 131 The court noted
121. See id. at 25 (detailing Corinthians contention that Sallen did not have
"reasonable apprehension of suit [as] required to meet Article III's case or contro-
versy requirement"). A reasonable apprehension of suit is only needed with re-
spect to a declaratoryjudgment in order to limit their use. See id. This is so "where
the only controversy surrounds a potential, future lawsuit." Id.
122. See id. at 16. Sallen's complaint sought:
to determine whether Sallen, a domain name registrant who has lost the
use of a domain name in a WIPO dispute resolution proceeding that de-
clared him a cybersquatter under the UDRP, may bring an action in fed-
eral court seeking (1) a declaration that he is not in violation of the
ACPA; (2) a declaration that he is not required to transfer the domain
name to [Corinthians]; and (3) such relief as necessary to effectuate
these ends.
Id. For a discussion of declaratory relief under the ACPA, see supra note 85 and
accompanying text.
123. See id. at 25 (noting claim by Corinthians that there must be "reasonable
apprehension of suit").
124. See id. (discussing Corinthians claim of no intent to sue Sallen).
125. See Sallen, 273 F.3d at 25. "The reasonable apprehension of suit doctrine
exists to cabin declaratory judgment actions where the only controversy surrounds
a potential, future lawsuit." Id.
126. See id. (depicting other grounds for case or controversy).
127. Id. at 26.
128. See id. at 25-26 (articulating dispute between Sallen and Corinthians).
For a discussion of the facts and procedural history, see supra notes 31-35 and
accompanying text.
129. See id. at 26 (positing WIPO panel found Sallen in violation of UDRP).
130. See Sallen, 273 F.3d at 26 (claiming order part of UDRP decision).
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that Sallen fought and defended against each of these actions.13 2
The First Circuit found the competing claims of Sallen and Corin-
thians, as well as the fact that Sallen had already defended himself
in one proceeding, sufficient to create a dispute.1 33 In the court's
view, the dispute had "progressed far beyond those cases in which a
declaratory defendant only questionably threatened suit.' 13 4 Thus,
the First Circuit found a sufficient dispute between the two parties
at the time Sallen filed suit to render the reasonable apprehension
argument of Corinthians moot and to satisfy the case or controversy
requirement of Article III.135
Once the court found a sufficient case or controversy to sustain
the cause of action under Article III, it considered and rejected the
claim by Corinthians that the ACPA could not provide Sallen with
relief.13 6 Corinthians contended that if there was any dispute be-
tween it and Sallen, it existed under the UDRP, not the ACPA.13 7
In the court's view, Corinthians' core argument was that "the ACPA
could not redress [Sallen's] UDRP defeat. ' 13 8 The First Circuit
found this claim invalid for three reasons.13 9 First, the so-called "in-
nocent user" provisions of the ACPA provide specific relief for do-
main name users whose domain names have been transferred in
administrative proceedings. 140 Next, the court found any claim of
exclusivity of dispute under the UDRP irrelevant because any
UDRP decision was non-binding on federal courts.' 4 ' Finally, the
ACPA could redress Sallen's grievances because judicial review is a
compromise essential to the creation of the UDRP.142
132. See id. at 26 (stating "Sallen objected to all of this").
133. See id. at 25. "[T]here is indeed a controversy between Sallen and
[Corinthians]: Sallen asserts that he has rights to corinthians.com and [Corinthi-
ans] asserts that it has mutually exclusive fights to the same domain name." Id.
134. Id. at 26.
135. See Sallen, 273 F.3d at 26 (finding dispute and "'reasonable apprehen-
sion' question irrelevant").
136. See id. (noting next issue addressed by court).
137. See id. (discussing claim by Corinthians as to lack of any dispute under
ACPA).
138. Id.
139. See id. (illustrating court's finding Corinthians were wrong about ACPA's
inability to restore Sallen after defeat under UDRP).
140. See Sallen, 273 F.3d at 26 (analyzing provisions of § 1114(2) (D) (v)). For
the relevant text of 15 U.S.C. § 1114(2) (D) (v), see supra note 85.
141. See Sallen, 273 F.3d at 26 (stating "the UDRP clearly contemplatesjudicial
intervention and, in fact, that the judicial outcome will override the UDRP one.").
142. See id. (opining "[t]he ability of the parties to a UDRP proceeding to
seek independent resolution of the issues was part of the compromise codified in
the UDRP").
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The court began its analysis of the ability of the ACPA to re-
dress Sallen's grievances by looking at the statute's "innocent user"
provision. 143 In doing so, the court looked to see whether Congress
granted a cause of action in the ACPA that could overrule the
UDRP. 144 The court began its analysis of the ACPA by looking at 15
U.S.C. § 1114(2)(D) (v). 145 The First Circuit found § 1114(2)
(D) (v) was meant to provide a cause of action for those who had
lost UDRP proceedings. 146 The First Circuit used the plain lan-
guage of the statute to find Sallen had a cause of action.' 47 The
court found Sallen was within the class the statute was meant to
protect: those who had their domain names taken away in adminis-
trative proceedings. 148
After finding the ACPA provided specific relief for Sallen, the
court addressed the claim of exclusivity.1 49 In other words, Corin-
thians sought a finding that the UDRP was binding on federal
courts. 150 Corinthians argued that even if the ACPA provided a
remedy, Sallen waived his rights when he agreed to the UDRP stan-
dards. 15' The court noted the language of Paragraph 4(k) of the
UDRP, which contemplates court action. 152 Next, the court consid-
ered the persuasive authority of Broadbridge, Weber-Stephen, and Par-
isi, which all found the UDRP non-binding on federal courts. 153
143. See id. at 24-25 (describing court's examination of innocent user provi-
sion of ACPA). For a discussion of innocent use, see supra notes 81-87 and accom-
panying text.
144. See id. at 27 (noting "whether Congress has, in fact, provided a cause of
action to override UDRP decisions").
145. See Sallen, 273 F.3d at 27 (investigating court's examination of
§ 1114(2) (D) (v)).
146. See id. (finding "an affirmative cause of action to recover domain names
lost in UDRP proceedings").
147. See id. (deciding Sallen met criteria for declaratory relief under
§ 1114(2) (D) (v)).
148. See id. (finding Sallen was one whose domain name had been "sus-
pended, disabled, or transferred").
149. See id. at 28 (arguing Sallen "waived his rights under the ACPA by agree-
ing to different standards under the UDRP").
150. See Sallen, 273 F.3d at 27 (finding "WIPO proceedings determine
whether a registrant's use of a domain name is in accordance with the UDRP, not
whether there has been a violation of a U.S. law").
151. See id. at 28 (arguing Sallen "agree[d] to different standards under the
UDRP").
152. See id. at 26 (discussing how UDRP "contemplates judicial intervention
and, in fact, that the judicial outcome will override the UDRP one"); see also UDRP
Policy, supra note 38 (listing text of UDRP paragraph 4(k)). For a discussion of
paragraph 4(k), see supra notes 38 and 45.
153. See Sallen, 273 F.3d at 26 (citing opinions and interpretations of UDRP in
Parisi v. Netlearning, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 745 (E.D. Va. 2001), Broadbridge Media,
L.L.C. v. HyperCD.com, 106 F. Supp. 2d 505 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), and Weber-Stephen Prods.
20041
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The court only briefly mentioned these cases because it sought not
to limit itself to adopting persuasive authority as justification for
finding the UDRP non-binding. 154
The court proceeded to offer its own reasoning as to why the
ACPA would trump any decision by an administrative panel under
the UDRP. 15 5 The court looked at § 1114(2) (D) (v), which allows
for any adverse UDRP decision to be reviewed by a court.156 The
First Circuit reasoned that Congress defined legitimate domain
name interests in the ACPA, and it was by these standards courts
were to render their opinions. 157 In fact, the court found that the
ACPA provision in question, § 1114(2) (D) (v), was designed to pro-
vide redress from trademark holders' abuse of the UDRP. 158 Fur-
ther, the court found that a WIPO panel interprets U.S. law, and
any finding by a U.S. court may change the law, undercutting the
decision of a WIPO panel.1 59 This was due to an overlap between
the ACPA and the UDRP. 160 Thus, the First Circuit found the
UDRP non-binding and non-exclusive, emphasizing that "WIPO
d[id] not create new law - it applie[d] existing law."161
Lastly, having found that the ACPA could redress Sallen's
grievances, the court noted that judicial review was an essential
compromise integrated into the UDRP. 162 The court found sup-
port for its conclusion in the Final WIPO Report.163 The court rec-
Co. v. Armitage Hardware & Bldg. Supply, Inc., No. 00-Cl 783, 2000 WL 562470, at *1
(N.D. I11. May 3, 2000)). For a discussion of these cases, see supra notes 90-116 and
accompanying text.
154. See id. at 27 (finding no conferral of jurisdiction by UDRP necessitates
looking at ACPA to find if Congress meant to override UDRP). The court engaged
in such an examination because it "would not lightly assume that Congress enacted
the ACPA, but intended all domain name registrants to be governed by a different
standard, administered by international dispute resolution panels, with no even-
tual recourse to whatever affirmative protections the U.S. law might provide." Id.
at 28.
155. See id. at 27 (stating reason for trump in overlap between UDRP and
ACPA).
156. See id. (interpreting language of § 1114(2) (D) (v) to find any decision
under UDRP reviewable). For a further discussion of the innocent use provision,
see supra note 85.
157. See id. at 28 (noting what Congress did in ACPA).
158. See Sallen, 273 F.3d at 29-30 (stating "this abusive behavior is best under-
stood to include administrative dispute resolution proceedings under the UDRP
where those proceedings are intended, as Sallen has asserted, to strip a domain
name from a registrant who has lawfully registered and used that domain name").
159. See id. at 27 (claiming WIPO does interpret U.S. law sometimes).
160. See id. (indicating overlap between UDRP and ACPA).
161. Id. at 28 (explaining WIPO found Sallen acted in bad faith).
162. See id. at 26-27 (discussing compromise).
163. See Sallen, 273 F.3d at 26 (looking at WIPO report).
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ognized, after reviewing the report, that WIPO did not want the
UDRP to be binding on courts, as the courts found such a concept
disconcerting. 164 The First Circuit noted that the decision to allow
litigation was pursued as a compromise to binding arbitration be-
cause it was more acceptable.' 65 According to the court, this com-
promise was embodied in Paragraph 4(k) of the UDRP Policy. 16 6
The ACPA's ability to trump the UDRP was deliberately provided
for in the UDRP and codified accordingly. 167 Thus, judicial review
was accepted as part of the UDRP and would allow the ACPA to
redress Sallen's grievances. 168 To be sure, the circuit court did not
discuss whether Sallen's underlying claim would win on reconsider-
ation by the district court.169 Rather, Sallen merely won the right to
have his claim heard. 1
70
B. Post-Game (Critical Analysis)
The Sallen court properly justified its holding that a sufficient
case or controversy existed and that the ACPA could redress Sal-
164. See id. (noting WIPO report); see also WIPO Final Report, supra note 17 at
46 (articulating reluctance to require registrants to agree to arbitration). In partic-
ular, WIPO's report stated:
If submission to arbitration by domain name applicants in respect of any
dispute relating to the domain name registration were, for example, to be
a requirement of the domain name registration agreement, the effect
would be to require the domain name applicant to abandon the right to
litigate such a dispute if called to arbitration by the other party to the
dispute. As mentioned above, however, the discussions and consultations
in the WIPO Process indicated considerable reluctance to subscribe to
such a solution ....
Id.
165. See Sallen, 273 F.3d at 26 (noting compromise to binding arbitration); see
also WIPO Final Report, supra note 17 at 46 (stating "[t]he WIPO Interim Report
recommended that any dispute-resolution system alternative to litigation that
might be adopted for domain name disputes should not deny the parties to the
dispute access to court litigation. This recommendation met with the support of
virtually all commentators").
166. See UDRP Policy, supra note 38. For relevant textual portions of para-
graph 4(k), see supra notes 37 and 45.
167. See Sallen, 273 F.3d at 26 (discussing incorporation of judicial review in
UDRP).
168. See id. (stating "[a] declaration of Sallen's compliance with the ACPA
would redress his loss of corinthians.com in the UDRP proceeding").
169. See Stern & Young, supra note 18, at Al7. 'Jurisdictional holding did not
mean Sallen would prevail on his underlying claim." Id.
170. See id. (finding "[r]estricting the law's jurisdiction only to cases involving
U.S.-registered mark holders, as the Brazilian company urged, would have left do-
main name holders without recourse against foreign mark holders .... ").
2004]
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len's grievances in this case of first impression. 171 The legislative
history of the UDRP, combined with the language of the UDRP and
the ACPA, provided ample support to justify the court's holding. 172
The First Circuit's decision also comported with district court
trends finding the UDRP non-binding. 173 The court's decision was
not only justified, but was necessary to the continued vitality of the
UDRP. 174
As the court discussed, the UDRP was the result of compro-
mise.17 5 During its creation, one of the first proposals suggested
the UDRP be treated as binding arbitration. 176 This proposal was
not well received. 177 It was only when access to the courts was rec-
ommended that people began to support the administrative pro-
cess of the UDRP. 178 Paragraph 4(k) of the UDRP embodies the
final form of the UDRP contemplating judicial review. 179 Thus,
when the UDRP was conceived, its creators realized the importance
of judicial review to the UDRP and provided for its presence.1 8 0
The language of the ACPA specifically provides a cause of ac-
tion for domain name registrants whose domain names are affected
by the UDRP.18s Congress provided § 1114 as a protective provi-
171. See Sallen, 273 F.3d at 18 (noting case of first impression); see also Stern &
Young, supra note 18, at A17 (discussing fact Sallen was first of thirty-nine cases
challenging UDRP decisions to reach circuit court).
172. See Sallen, 273 F.3d at 26-28 (reviewing UDRP history and plain language
of UDRP and ACPA); see also Stern & Young, supra note 18, at A17 (regarding
UDRP and ACPA, "arbitration and court review are parts of an articulated whole").
173. For a discussion of this trend, see supra notes 90-116 and accompanying
text.
174. See Froomkin, supra note 47, at 706. "If a national court in ajurisdiction
with an active population of domain name registrants were to follow the district
court in the Corinthians.com case and hold that registrants have no way to bring a
case after losing, it would break the fundamental fairness of the UDRP beyond
repair." Id.
175. See Sallen, 273 F.3d at 26 (discussing "ability of the parties to a UDRP
proceeding to seek independent resolution of the issues was part of the compro-
mise codified in the UDRP"); see also Froomkin, supra note 47, at 705 (ensuring
"registrants would have some sort of access to a judge after losing an arbitration
was a critical element of the original compromise that produced the UDRP").
176. See WIPO Final Report, supra note 17 at 46 (discussing idea of binding
arbitration).
177. See id. (noting idea of binding arbitration was met with "considerable
reluctance").
178. See id. (discussing support for judicial review).
179. See UDRP Policy, supra note 38 (suggesting UDRP provides for court ac-
tion). For a discussion of paragraph 4(k), see supra notes 38 and 45.
180. See WIPO Final Report, supra note 17 at 46 (recognizing desire to permit
intervention of courts).
181. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(2) (D) (v) (2000) (providing cause of action to "[a]
domain name registrant whose domain name has been suspended, disabled, or
transferred under a policy described under § 1114(2) (D) (ii) (II)").
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sion to shield those who were making an innocent, non-commercial
use of a domain name.1 82 While the ACPA itself did not apply to
innocent conduct, Congress felt that such innocent users needed
some measure of protection from possible abuse of the UDRP by
trademark holders. 183 Hence, the First Circuit correctly found that
the declaratory relief provision in § 1114 provided a cause of action
sufficient to meet Article III's case or controversy requirement.1 8 4
The issue facing the Sallen court was one of first impression. 18 5
Therefore, the First Circuit had little binding precedent for gui-
dance, but it did have the persuasive authority of Broadbridge and
Weber-Stephen.' 86 Both district court cases engaged in an in-depth
analysis of the UDRP and its important Paragraph 4(k).1187 The
First Circuit found the district court cases and Parisi to be persua-
sive support for its own analysis and conclusion as to the non-bind-
ing effect of the UDRP. 188  Both Broadbridge and Weber-Stephen
comported closely with the First Circuit's own analysis of UDRP Par-
agraph 4(k). 189 Therefore, the First Circuit was justified in finding
the UDRP non-binding, given the trend in the district courts. 190
§ 1114(2) (D) (ii) (II) states, "in the implementation of a reasonable policy by such
registrar, registry, or authority prohibiting the registration of a domain name that
is identical to, confusingly similar to, or dilutive of another's mark."
§ 1114(2) (D) (ii) (II).
182. See H.R. REP. No. 106-412, at 1 (1999) (noting protection for innocent
users).
183. See Sallen v. Corinthians, 273 F.3d 14, 29 (1st Cir. 2001) (finding
"[s]ubsection (D) (v) is best understood as creating a protection for registrants to
counteract abusive behavior by trademark holders").
184. See Stern, supra note 38 at 1 (quoting intellectual property lawyers dis-
cussing outcome of case and result that now federal courts have last say on
cybersquatting).
185. See Sallen, 273 F.3d at 18 (noting case of first impression); see also Stern &
Young, supra note 18, at A17 (noting first of thirty-nine UDRP challenges to reach
circuit court).
186. See Sallen, 273 F.3d at 26.
187. See Broadbridge Media, L.L.C. v. HyperCD.com, 106 F. Supp. 2d 505, 509
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (discussing expert interpretation of UDRP); Weber-Stephen
Prods. Co. v. Armitage Hardware & Bldg. Supply, Inc., No. 00-C1783, 2000 WL
562470, at *1-2 (N.D. Ill. May 3, 2000) (contemplating legal effect of UDRP).
188. See Sallen, 273 F.3d at 26.
189. See id. at 26-27 (noting UDRP paragraph 4(k) contemplates court
action).
190. See Parisi v. Netlearning, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 745, 753 (E.D. Va. 2001)
(finding UDRP not binding arbitration); Broadbridge, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 509 (hold-
ing UDRP does not control in court); Weber-Stephen, 2000 WL 562470, at *2 (find-
ing UDRP non-binding on federal courts); see also Stern & Young, supra note 18, at
A17 (noting thirty-nine UDRP decisions have been taken to court).
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The decision of the First Circuit went to the heart of the
UDRP. 191 At its core, the UDRP provides for fair treatment. 192
This fairness is embodied in Paragraph 4(k), which allows for judi-
cial review of UDRP decisions. 193 Although parties are contractu-
ally bound to the UDRP, they are not bound to its results.' 94 The
essence of the UDRP's fairness is that those who feel they have been
wronged may seek relief elsewhere. 195 Had the First Circuit held
"that registrants have no way to bring a case after losing, it would
break the fundamental fairness of the UDRP beyond repair."
1 96
Thus, the First Circuit's decision was justified compared to the dis-
trict court's dismissal, which would have denied judicial review and
destroyed the fairness element of the UDRP. 19
7
V. IMPACT
The impact of Sallen is uncertain. Sallen continues the trend of
federal district courts finding the UDRP non-binding. 198 To date,
the First Circuit is the highest court to render a decision on the
ability of the ACPA to trump the UDRP. 199
There is no doubt the UDRP has proven a popular and useful
device. 20 0 Yet, with the inability of the UDRP to withstand counter-
attacks under the ACPA, its usefulness may be coming to an end.
20
'
191. See Froomkin, supra note 47, at 705-06 (discussing Corinthians outcome).
192. See id. (noting fundamental fairness of UDRP).
193. See UDRP Policy, supra note 38 (providing for judicial review).
194. See Sallen, 273 F.3d at 20 (noting parties are not bound to UDRP results).
The court noted, "registrants must accept the UDRP's terms in order to register a
domain name." Id. As to the UDRP, the court found "a registrant is 'required to
submit to a mandatory administrative proceeding in the event that a third party"'
makes a claim under the UDRP. Id. at 21.
195. See Froomkin, supra note 47, at 705-06 (emphasizing fairness of UDRP).
196. Id. at 706.
197. See id. (discussing possible outcome had district court been affirmed).
198. See Parisi v. Netlearning, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 745, 751-52 (E.D. Va.
2001) (noting power and effect of UDRP on registrants and courts); Broadbridge
Media, L.L.C. v. HyperCD.com, 106 F. Supp. 2d505, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (discuss-
ing reach of UDRP and finding jurisdiction); Weber-Stephen Prods. Co. v. Armit-
age Hardware & Bldg. Supply, Inc., No. 00-C1783, 2000 WL 526470, at *1-2 (N.D.
Ill. May 3, 2000) (depicting legal effects of UDRP).
199. See Sallen, 273 F.3d at 18 (characterizing case as one of first impression);
see also Stern & Young, supra note 18, at A17 (discussing first of thirty-nine cases to
go to circuit court).
200. See Hestermeyer, supra note 33, at 1 (declaring 3,845 UDRP decisions
rendered as of November 2001). For a discussion of the current use of the UDRP,
see supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
201. See id. at 29 (discussing invalidity of UDRP under European law). This is
in addition to the problems the UDRP has experienced under the ACPA, because
of doubt about its validity under German and French law. See id.
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The challenges to the UDRP come at a time when the Internet is
still growing, expanding, and witnessing internal administrative
changes. 20 2 One of the reasons the UDRP may lose its current fol-
lowing is that a UDRP victor may still be forced to incur the ex-
penses of litigation to defend a UDRP decision from a lawsuit
under the ACPA.203 Such costs are precisely what a prevailing
UDRP party seeks to avoid when initiating a proceeding under the
UDRP.2 04
In Panavision, Toeppen's blatant episodes of cybersquatting
were one of the primary reasons for creating the ACPA.20 5 It seems
misguided to provide a means under the ACPA for cybersquatters
to attack UDRP decisions, decisions which the federal courts would
have probably also reached given the bad faith factors they may
consider.20 6 While Congress sought to protect innocent users, Con-
gress may have only succeeded in providing the wolves with sheep's
clothing.20 7
Clark D. Robertson
202. See Sullivan, supra note 58 (discussing ICANN's decision to switch ".org"
management responsibilities from VeriSign, Inc. to ISOC (Internet Society)).
ISOC is a group of Internet engineers. See id.
203. See Ottaviani, supra note 25, at 36 (noting UDRP victor may have to "sub-
sequently litigate the same issues in a federal court trial, without the benefit of any
presumptions from the UDRP proceeding").
204. See id. (finding "the trademark owner would lose the time and cost ad-
vantage of the UDRP procedure").
205. See H.R. REP. No. 106-412, at 11 (1999) (noting desire of House to pre-
vent Toeppen-style cyberpiracy with ACPA). For a discussion of Toeppen-style
cyberpiracy, see supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text.
206. For a discussion of bad faith, see supra notes 78-79 and accompanying
text.
207. See H.R. REP. No. 106-412, at 1 (indicating desire to protect innocent
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